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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SUBSTANTIAL EQUALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The plaintiff, a Negro of high school age, wished to enroll in
courses in Spanish, Civics III, Typewriting and Physical Education,
but alleged she was told that such courses were not or could not
be offered. Plaintiff then brought her action as a class suit, on
behalf of all Negroes of high school age residing in the county.
She sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against the
School Board of Arlington County from alleged discrimination
against Negro students by failing to provide them, solely because
of their race or color, with facilities and opportunities for high school
education equal to those furnished white students. The United
States District Court, E. D. Virginia, found the Negro school to
be in need of certain major improvements, both in physical structure
and courses offered, but classed these needs as administrative de-
ficiencies. Judgment, however, was entered for the defendants
since the evidence failed to establish discrimination and a lack of
substantially equal facilities solely because of race or color. Carter
v. School Board of Arlington County, et al., 87 F. Supp. 745 (1950).
In reaching this result the court said, "While 'no intent' will
not excuse actual disparity of treatment, if traceable to race or
color, still just as truly, every inadequacy or insufficiency of pro-
vision in educational opportunities or other public facilities, is not
discrimination as denounced by the Fourteenth Amendment. A
difference in provision may exist between the white, between the
colored citizens, or between the white and colored, without fouling
the Amendment, if it is the rsult only of unattentive stewardship
or faulty judgment or shortsighted planning by the responsible
authorities. These are defects of administration for administrative
correction, not constitutional offenses for judicial interference."
The Supreme Court of the United States has laid down and
has recently reiterated the rule that a state may separate the white
and the colored for educational purposes, but substantially equal
facilities and opportunities must be furnished.' The guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws contained in the Fourteenth Amhend-
ment operates as a protection against state action, by statute or
otherwise, which denies to any person, on account of race or color,
equal accommodation in public schools.2 What constitutes "sub-
stantially equal facilities and opportunities" must of ourse be
determined from the facts of each case. However the courts have
formulated several governing principles in attempts to define this
all important term. Equality of treatment does not necessarily
mean identity of treatment3 and equality of treatment does not
require that privileges be provided members of the two races in
the same place.4 The requirement of equal facilities is one of
equal treatment in respect to any one facility or opportunity fur-
nished to its citizens rather than a balance to be struck from the
expenditures and provisions for each race generally.s
In the instant case the court goes to great lengths in a com-
parision of curricula, exterior and interior building facilities, health
supervision and teachers, and has found that no discrimination in
fact exists. Nevertheless, the court finds many differences, saying,
"There are differences in the schools but they are only differences
and nothing more. . . .The court finds there is no discrimination.
Certainly none has been proved by the preponderance of the evi-
dence." The court explains that many of these so called differences
arise out of the difference in enrollment, pointing out that the Negro
school had an enrollment varying from three to thirty-five while
the white school was fairly constant at twenty-three hundred.
However, the right to equal protection of the laws is an individual
and personal right.6 The Supreme Court reiterated the rule saying
that the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal
right and is not dependant upon the number of persons discrim-
inated against.7 The financial considerations involved in the main-
tenance of separate equal facilities and in providing separate equal.
educational facilities have no controlling force in the face of an in-
vasion of a constitutional right.8 It is submitted that in the light
of this language, a "difference" cannot cursorily be dismissed as an
"administrative deficiency." If that "difference" amounts to a sub-
stantial inequality in the respective educational facilities or oppor-
tunities provided for the Negro and white, it is discrimination.
Several federal courts in Virginia have recently had occasion
to deal with this problem of separate but substantially equal educa-
tional facilities. In the consolidated Freeman case,9 the court found
differences and need for improvement in the facilities and oppor-
tunities provided the Negro children of King George County and
Gloucester County and granted an injunction enjoining further
continuance of such discrimination. A similar case arose in Pulaski
Countylo and Dobie, Circuit Judge, in reversing in part, found,
after a comparison of the various educational facilities, "a glaring
inequality of facilities when viewing the record as a whole." Judge
Dobie went on to say "Absolute equality here is impractical and
somewhat Utopian, yet substantial equality is required by mandate
of the Fourteenth Amendment." In remanding in part as to the
elementary schools, the court cautions, "The question cannot be
decided by averaging the facilities provided for the two classes of
pupils throughout the county by comparing one with the other."
It is again submitted that the classification of "administrative de-
ficiencies" does not bear out the substantial equality mandate of the
Supreme Court nor of the above language.
From an examination of the casesur the separate, but sub-
stantial equality rule seems to be a matter of degree. For example,
the fact that the plaintiff was compelled to go approximately one-
fifth of a mile further to attend the colored school than she would
have had to go to attend the white school,12 or that colored children
had to travel a considerable distance and cross several railroad
tracks to reach their school,i3 did not destroy the equivalence of
educational facilities. But where a school for colored children is
so located that access to it is difficult; and dangerous or an unreason-
able distance must be travelled, and the white children do not have
these same substantial disadvantages, equal educational facilities have
not been provided.14
Although it is true that some cases have stated that certain
differences in colored and white educational facilities were mere
administrative differences and not discriminatory,]s it must be
remembered that the basis of these decisions was that these differ-
ences did not amount to substantial inequality. The theory of
the cases was not that since the differences were administrative
deficiencies they were not discriminatory.
It may well be that the Carter case is in line with an apparent
recent trend in the lower courts to decide this type of case as a matter
of expediency according to local conditions and customs, thus cir-
cumventing the law rather than facing this issue. squarely.
In a late Oklahoma decision,x6 the court said that forcing a
Negro student to take an assigned desk, a special table in the library,
and eat at different hours was not discrimination in as much as the
student had equal educational opportunities and facilities in the
class room. The court quickly disposed of plaintiff's contention
that such conditions created a mental hazard by saying this was
merely the carrying out of Oklahoma's valid segregation laws. In
Georgia'7 after several years of litigation the court refused to face
the issue of discrimination in teachers' salaries by relying on the old
standby that the plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies
before he is entitled to his day in court.
It is submitted that any difference in educational facilities
which a Negro student is required to bear because of a state policy
of segregation preventing him from attending a public school of his
own choice within his local district, stems primarily from, and is
traceable to, his race or color. When this "difference" becomes
substantial, then the Negro's constitutional right as guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment has been invaded. Although in a given
case the "difference" may be the result of short sighted administra-
tive planning, or inability of the administrative officials because
of financial deficiencies, rather than of a patterned intent or custom,
the distinction is without a constitutional difference. The separate
but substantial equality rule, where a state policy is that of segre-
gationx8 is a matter of effect and not cause and in the light of recent
cases will be strictly construed by the Supreme Court.19
A. ROBERT DOLL
FOOTNOTES
1. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938); Sipuel
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U. S.
631 (1948); Comment, 46 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 645 (1948).
2. 14 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM 1171.
3. See Note, 24 R. C. L. §110 (1929).
4. Ibid.
5. Pearson et al. v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936); See
Note 103 A. L. R. 706 (1936).
6. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry., 325 U. S. 151 (1914).
7. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
8. Sweatt v. Pointer, Tex. Civ. App., 210 S. W. 2d 442 (1948).
9. Freeman v. County School Board, 82 F. Supp. 167.
10. Corbin et al. v. County School Board of Pulaski County, Vir-
ginia, 177 F. 2d 924 (1950).
11. See Note, 24 R. C. L. §110 (1929).
12. Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 198, (1849).
13. Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 P. 273 (1912).
14. Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202, 99 P. 216 (1908).
15. E. g. Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 P. 274
(1903).
16. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, et
al., 87 F. Supp. 528 (1950).
17. Cook et al. v. Davis, 178 F. 2d 595 (1950).
17. Va. Const. §141, Va. Code §22-221 (1950).
19. See Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,
332 U. S. 631 (1948).
